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About the Course This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, cred...
We discuss auctions. We first distinguish two extremes: common values and private values. We hold a common value auction in class and discov...
We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always inter...
In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior...
We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relati...
We first play and then analyze wars of attrition; the games that afflict trench warfare, strikes, and businesses in some competitive setting...
We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players’ trusting that oth...
We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midterm. We represent wha...
We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave it offer), and build...
In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-store paradox. We discuss how to build the idea of reputation into game theory; in p...
We first discuss Zermelo’s theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to for...
We first apply our big idea–backward induction–to analyze quantity competition between firms when play is sequential, the Stackelberg model....
We consider games in which players move sequentially rather than simultaneously, starting with a game involving a borrower and a lender. We...
We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive...
We discuss evolution and game theory, and introduce the concept of evolutionary stability. We ask what kinds of strategies are evolutionaril...
We develop three different interpretations of mixed strategies in various contexts: sport, anti-terrorism strategy, dating, paying taxes and...
We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed aver...
We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far...
We first consider the alternative “Bertrand” model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than sett...
We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the...
We first define formally the new concept from last time: Nash equilibrium. Then we discuss why we might be interested in Nash equilibrium an...
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea t...
We apply the main idea from last time, iterative deletion of dominated strategies, to analyze an election where candidates can choose their...
At the start of the lecture, we introduce the “formal ingredients” of a game: the players, their strategies and their payoffs. Then we retur...
We introduce Game Theory by playing a game. We organize the game into players, their strategies, and their goals or payoffs; and we learn th...