Epistemically Detrimental Dissent and the Milian Argument against the Freedom of Inquiry

Anna Leuschner (KIT) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 April, 2014) titled "Epistemically Detrimental Dissent and the Milian Argument against the Freedom of Inquiry". Abstract: I'll present a joint work that I have been conducting with Justin Biddle. The idea of epistemically problematic dissent is counterintuitive at first glance; as Mill argues, even misguided dissent from a consensus position can be epistemically fruitful as it can lead to a deeper understanding of consensus positions. Yet, focusing on climate science we argue that dissent can be epistemically problematic when it leads to a distortion of risk assessment in mainstream science. I'll examine the conditions under which dissent in science is epistemically detrimental, provide empirical support for this finding, and conclude with a discussion on normative consequences of these findings by considering Philip Kitcher’s "Millian argument against the freedom of inquiry".

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Epistemically Detrimental Dissent and the Milian Argument against the Freedom of Inquiry is an episode from MCMP – Epistemology by Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.

This episode is 00:40:57 long.

This episode was published on Apr 18, 2019.

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