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Who Should The Fed Answer To? - ft. Sir Paul Tucker artwork
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Who Should The Fed Answer To? - ft. Sir Paul Tucker

Capitalisn't by University of Chicago Podcast Network

Jan 15, 202600:53:21Business

Is the Federal Reserve’s independence a pillar of democracy or a convenient shield that allows elected officials to duck their responsibilities? This week on Capitalisn’t , we confront a shift in Washington after the Jus...

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Who Should The Fed Answer To? - ft. Sir Paul Tucker is an episode from Capitalisn't by University of Chicago Podcast Network. Is the Federal Reserve’s independence a pillar of democracy or a convenient shield that allows elected officials t...

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Published Jan 15, 2026, 00:53:21 long, audio available.

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Is the Federal Reserve’s independence a pillar of democracy or a convenient shield that allows elected officials to duck their responsibilities? This week on Capitalisn’t , we confront a shift in Washington after the Justice Department served subpoenas on the Fed. Joining the conversation is Former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Paul Tucker, who complicates the definition of central bank autonomy. If monetary policy is a "latent instrument of taxation," should it be shielded from the King—the executive branch—and reclaimed by the legislature? We explore the provocative argument that the Fed has become dangerously wary of its relationship with Congress, acting as a self-governing entity rather than a delegated authority. Does the U.S. model, where the Fed defines its own version of price stability, explain the accountability gap we see when supervisory failures like the SVB collapse result in zero consequences for leadership? Finally, we address an unsettling mystery regarding the global financial system. If Fed independence is truly degrading, why are the markets so strangely sanguine? Are global investors simply anesthetized by the AI boom, or does the dollar’s global monopoly allow the U.S. to decay without paying an immediate price? We debate whether the market has ceased to be a barometer for institutional health and instead become a tool for protecting shareholder rents—failing to interpret a "catastrophic forecast" until it is already too late. Tucker is also the author of " Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State " & " Global Discord: Values and Power in a Fractured World Order ".

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Who Should The Fed Answer To? - ft. Sir Paul Tucker is an episode from Capitalisn't by University of Chicago Podcast Network.

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This episode is 00:53:21 long.

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This episode was published on Jan 15, 2026.

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Who Should The Fed Answer To? - ft. Sir Paul Tucker is from Capitalisn't by University of Chicago Podcast Network.

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Published Jan 15, 2026 and 00:53:21 long